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THE CARTOON CONTROVERSY IN
CONTEXT: ANALYZING THE DECISION
NOT TO PROSECUTE UNDER DANISH LAW
Stéphanie Lagoutte*
INTRODUCTION

I

n September 2005, the publication of twelve cartoons in the daily
newspaper Jyllands-Posten started a small storm in the Danish me1
dia. A few months later, demonstrators around the world organized to
protest the cartoons. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, demonstrators acted out
against Danish embassies, making threats and setting fires.2 The storm
became a hurricane, and Denmark found itself in the middle of its biggest diplomatic crisis in recent memory. After a few weeks, the storm
abated. A mere nine months had passed since the cartoons’ initial publication when United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Denmark on June 18, 2006. In comments to journalists, he observed
that the page had turned in the cartoon controversy and consequently
journalists should forego examination of the past in favor of looking
ahead.3 Notwithstanding the need to avoid inflaming such controversies,
a concern that no doubt motivated Annan’s comments, it is equally, if not
more important, to scrutinize such stories to understand their mechanisms and trajectories prior to looking ahead and moving on.
Before unraveling the events of September 2005, it is necessary to
mention an important historical antecedent: Danish prosecution of Nazis
for blasphemy. In 1938, the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre
Landsret) confirmed the conviction of a number of Danish Nazis for
blasphemy under section 140 of the Danish Criminal Code for having,
among other things, distributed media that falsely stated that the Talmud
permitted Jewish men to force non-Jewish girls to engage in sexual inter* Stéphanie Lagoutte, Researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights. Doctor
in Law (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France), Ph.D. (Århus University,
Denmark). This Article builds on a paper presented to a panel discussion on the International Regulation of Expression, during the inaugural session of the United Nations
(“U.N.”) Human Rights Council (June 22, 2006), at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
Switzerland.
1. See Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDSPOSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in PROFET-AFFÆREN [THE PROPHET AFFAIR] 14–
15 (Anders Jerikow & Mille Rode eds., Dansk PEN 2006) (reprinting the cartoons) [hereinafter THE PROPHET AFFAIR].
2. THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 145–53.
3. DR1 21 O’clock News (DR1 television broadcast, June 18, 2006). DR1 is a TV
channel of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, a public broadcasting company.
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course.4 This case was the last time a court handed down a criminal conviction for blasphemy in Denmark. It reflects a Denmark that protected
its minority population from abuses; this is all the more noteworthy because it took place at a time when anti-Semitism was widespread in
Europe.5
In contrast, returning to the cartoon controversy of 2005, Danish authorities were of the opinion that there was no legal basis for a response
to the Jylland-Posten’s controversial publication.6 From the perspective
of international human rights law, even though freedom of expression is
a human right protected by a number of international conventions, governmental restrictions on freedom of expression are permitted by international human rights law.7 However, tolerating interference with freedom
of expression is not the same as requiring such interference in order to
protect the freedom and rights of others. In other words, although Danish
authorities elected not to intervene in the cartoon controversy, they could
have, had there been a legal basis for doing so, without violating the international law provisions protecting freedom of expression. By the same

4. UfR 1938.419 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark); see
Henning Koch, Ytringsfrihed og Tro [Freedom of Expression and Belief], in
GUDEBILLEDER: YTRINGSFRIHED OG RELIGION I EN GLOBALISERET VERDEN. ANTOLOGI.
[IMAGES OF GODS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGION IN A GLOBAL WORLD.
ANTHOLOGY.] 72, 76 (Lisbet Christoffersen ed., Tiderne Skifter 2006) (discussing
prevalence of anti-Semitism in Europe during World War II).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON GLOBAL ANTI-SEMITISM (Jan. 5, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/40258.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
6. See Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambassadører [Letter from
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors] (Oct. 21, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28; Undenrigsminister Per Stig Møller:
Brev til Egyptens udenrigsminister [Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Per Stig Møller
to the Egyptian Foreign Minister] (Nov. 8, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR,
supra note 1, at 34. Both letters reflect the Danish authorities’ refusal to use political
means to respond to the controversy. See also DPP Decision, infra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute).
7. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(3), opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]. Article 19(3) states:
The exercise of [the right to freedom of expression] carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Id.
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token, in refraining from such interference, the Danish authorities did not
violate any positive obligations under human rights provisions.8
More time must pass before it will be possible to document and understand exactly all the interests at stake and the various processes involved
in the cartoon controversy. The purpose of this Article is therefore simply to acquaint the reader with the Danish context, to explain the legal
implications of the crisis in Denmark, and to root out some of the popular
misunderstandings about both. It is not a goal of this Article to address
the international dimensions of the crisis. Among other important elements, it will instead show how the crisis originated in a misunderstanding of competing values such that a choice was made to advance one
value (freedom of expression) to the exclusion of certain others (nondiscrimination, respect for other religions, protection of minorities, etc.),
despite the fact that the Danish authorities, among them the Prime Minister, had a variety of solutions at their disposal for tackling the situation.
Even though the ultimate decision not to take action was not a direct violation of international human rights obligations, a choice more consistent
with Denmark’s historical commitment to the support and protection of
minorities probably could have been made.9
This Article explores the many components of the Danish cartoon controversy in an attempt to understand what really happened and has been
happening in Denmark since late 2005. Part I sets forth a brief factual
account of the genesis of the cartoon controversy. Part II then goes on to
discuss the legal framework for the controversy—both in Denmark and
internationally. Next, Part III looks at the Danish Director of Public
Prosecution’s decision not to bring criminal proceedings in response to
the cartoons’ publication. Finally, Part IV examines the emphasis placed
on freedom of expression in both the Danish and international arenas.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS IN DENMARK
The twelve drawings at issue were published by Jyllands-Posten, a major Danish newspaper, in an article called The Face of Mohammed on
September 30, 2005.10 In an excerpt from the article that appeared on the
8. See generally John Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist Resolutions, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 357 (2008) (discussing how international human
rights law can accommodate both freedom of expression and freedom of religion).
9. See Director of Public Prosecutions [DPP], Decision on Possible Criminal Proceedings in the Case of Jyllands-Posten’s Article “The Face of Muhammed,” No. RA2006-41-0151, Mar. 15, 2006, available at http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/media/
bilag/afgorelse_engelsk.pdf [hereinafter DPP Decision].
10. See Anders Jerichow & Mille Rode, Forord [Foreward] to THE PROPHET AFFAIR,
supra note 1, at 9.
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front page, the newspaper reproduced one of the cartoons and explained
that the newspaper had invited members of the Danish Newspaper Illustrators’ Union to submit drawings of Mohammed “as they saw him.”11
This excerpt read in part: “Some Muslims reject modern, secular society.
They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of
their own religious feelings. This is incompatible with secular democracy
and freedom of expression, where one has to be ready to put up with
scorn, mockery and ridicule.”12
The Face of Mohammed was set out in three columns surrounded by
the twelve drawings.13 The article, written by Flemming Rose, the newspaper’s cultural editor, was headed Freedom of Expression and drew attention to recent incidents in which authors engaged in self-censorship
(three were mentioned) to avoid provoking Muslims.14 In addition, the
article noted that during a meeting with the Prime Minister “an imam
urged the government to use its influence over the Danish media so that
they can draw a more positive picture of Islam.”15 The article opined that
such incidents reflected a desire of some Muslims for special treatment,
which presented a threat to the free exchange of ideas in the public forum.16 Although the article did not itself explain its choice to juxtapose

11. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDSPOSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 14–16.
12. Id. at 14.
13. For reproductions of the page from the Jyllands-Posten, see id. at 15. For a description in English of the twelve drawings, see DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 2–3. See
also Joel Brinkley & Ian Fisher, U.S. Says It Also Finds Cartoons of Muhammad Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at A3.
14. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDSPOSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 14–16.
15. “[E]n imam regeringen til at gøre sin indflydelse gældende over for danske
medier, så de kan tegne et mere positivt billede af islam.” See DPP Decision, supra note
9, at 2 (quoting and translating Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3).
16. Id. (citing Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The Face of Mohammed],
JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3). According to the DPP
Decision, the Flemming article stated:
De anførte eksempler giver grund til bekymring, hvad enten den oplevede frygt
hviler på et falsk grundlag eller ej. Faktum er, at den findes, og at den fører til
selvcensur. Der sker en intimidering af det offentlige rum. Kunstnere, forfattere, tegnere, oversættere og teaterfolk går derfor i en stor bue uden om vor tids
vigtige kulturmøde, det mellem islam og de sekulære, vestlige samfund med
rod i kristendommen.
Id. The translation reads as follows:
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the article with the Mohammed drawings, Denmark’s Director of Public
Prosecutions (“DPP”) ultimately stated that the basic assumption “must
be that Jyllands-Posten commissioned the drawings for the purpose of
debating, in a provocative manner, whether, in a secular society, special
regard should be paid to the religious feelings of some Muslims.”17
Reactions in Denmark were immediate. A few days after publication,
the illustrators at Jyllands-Posten received death threats.18 On October 5,
2005, a spokesman for various Danish Muslim associations19 appealed to
the diplomatic missions of Muslim states to take part in an official protest.20 Some of these associations issued a joint press release expressing

The cited examples give cause for concern, regardless of whether the fear experienced is founded on a false basis. The fact is that the fear does exist and
that it leads to self-censorship. The public space is being intimidated. Artists,
authors, illustrators, translators and people in theatre are therefore steering a
wide berth around the most important meeting of cultures in our time—the
meeting between Islam and the secular society of the West, which is rooted in
Christianity.
Id.
17. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 6. However, the Jyllands-Posten article itself has a
much broader perspective:
Some Muslims reject modern, secular society. They demand a special position,
insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one has to be
ready to put up with scorn, mockery and ridicule. It is therefore no coincidence
that people living in totalitarian societies are sent off to jail for telling jokes or
for critical depictions of dictators. As a rule, this is done with reference to the
fact that it offends people’s feelings. In Denmark, we have not yet reached this
stage, but the cited examples show that we are on a slippery slope to a place
where no one can predict what self-censorship will lead to.
Id. at 2.
18. However, it was soon discovered that the threats had been sent by a seventeenyear-old boy who was mentally ill and could not be attributed to Muslim organizations.
See 17-årig Sigtet for Trusler [17-year-old Target of Threats], JYLLANDS-POSTEN
[JUTLAND POST] (Den.), Oct. 15, 2005, available at http://jp.dk/indland/article211610.ece.
19. The organizations in question were: the Islamic Faith Community (Islamisk Trossamfund), the Islamic Federation (Islamisk Forbund), and the Group of Muslim Immigrants Associations (Sammenslutningen af Muslimske Indvandrerforeninger). The Islamic Faith Community, the most prominent of the three organizations, has been called
“conservative.” ULLA HOLM, THE DANISH UGLY DUCKLING AND THE MOHAMMED
CARTOONS 1 (Danish Inst. for Int’l Studies 2006), http://www.diis.dk/graphics/
Publications/Briefs2006/uho_muhammed1.pdf.
20. Islamisk trossamfund m.fl.: Brev til muslimske ambassadører [Letter from the
Muslim Organizations to the Muslim Ambassadors in Denmark] (Oct. 5, 2005), reprinted
in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 18–19.
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their concerns and criticisms.21 The appeal to foreign diplomatic missions by the Danish-Muslim community is quite disturbing in itself; despite the variety of reasons that may have motivated the appeal, it leaves
the strong impression that, at the time, some representatives of the Danish-Muslim community did not think the Danish government would protect their interests as a religious minority. Moreover, the involvement of
foreign authorities in the crisis gave it all the dimensions of a diplomatic
crisis at a very early stage.
A week after this appeal, ambassadors from Muslim countries responded with a letter to the Danish Prime Minister denouncing an “ongoing smear campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam
and Muslims” and requesting an urgent meeting.22 In addition to the cartoons, the ambassadors cited various episodes: a racist program on a Nazi
radio station, derogatory remarks against Muslims by a member of Parliament, and a statement by the Minister of Culture about the “war”
against Muslims.23 The Prime Minister responded in a letter that emphasized freedom of expression, religious tolerance, and the equality of all
religions in Denmark. 24 He explained that Danish law prohibited blasphemous and racist expressions and that potential victims could bring a
case before the Danish courts.25 Although he dwelled on the importance
of dialogue between cultures and religions in Denmark and the need for
international cooperation between Denmark and the Muslim world, he
made no mention of a meeting.26
In the following weeks and months, a debate about these events raged
in Denmark. The public debate took place on several levels: a legal discussion on the freedom of the press, freedom of religion, protection of
minorities, blasphemy and hate speech; a media-ethics discussion on the
role played by Jyllands-Posten; and a more general political discussion
on the place of the Muslim community and religion in general in Denmark.27 Various actors took part: politicians from both majority and op21. Islamisk Trossamfund i pressemeddelelse [Islamic Faith Community Press Release] (Oct. 11, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 21–22.
22. Muslimske ambassadører: Brev til Danmarks statsminister [Letter from the Muslim Ambassadors to the Danish Prime Minister] (Oct. 12, 2005), reprinted in THE
PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 24.
23. Id.
24. Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambassadører [Letter from the
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors] (Oct. 21, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Islamisk Trossamfund, Pressemeddelelse [Islamic Faith Community
Press Release], Vi Ønsker Værn Om Vores Borgerlige Rettigheder [We Wish to Protect
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position parties; scholars, journalists, and news commentators; Christian
Danes, resident Muslims, and Danish-Muslim citizens.28 One of the principal characteristics of the debate was its polarization: freedom of expression versus protection of minorities and Danish traditionalists versus
Muslim immigrants.29 The internationalization of the crisis only aggravated the polemics. It would take more time for a nuanced attitude to
enter the public debate.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN DENMARK
A. The International Legal Framework
Knowing now what happened in and around September 2005, it is important to examine the legal structures at play. As far as the international
legal framework is concerned, Denmark has ratified all major human
rights instruments, with only two exceptions: the Revised European Social Charter of 1996 and Protocol 12 to the European Convention on
Human Rights.30 The treaties that Denmark has signed, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
contain substantive obligations to protect freedom of expression while

Our Civil Rights], reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 35–39 (listing a
number of concerns expressed by some Muslims in Denmark); Marianne Jelved, Om
Ytringsfrihed Endnu Engang [About Freedom of Expression One More Time], DET
RADIKALE VENSTRE [RADICAL PARTY WEEKLY LETTER] (Jan. 13, 2006), reprinted in THE
PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 70–71 (describing Danish priests preaching tolerance
in various churches for the New Year 2006).
28. See Enhedslisten [Red-Green Alliance], Ytringsfriheden gælder for alle [Freedom
of Expression is for Everyone] (Dec. 3, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra
note 1, at 41–43 (comments from various politicians and political parties); Rikke Hvilshøj, integrationsminister [Minister for Integration], Stop klyngeriet [Stop Whimpering],
POLITIKEN (Dec. 20, 2005), in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 58–59; Statsminister
Anders Fogh Rasmussen [Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen], Nytarståle [New
Year’s Speech] (Jan. 1, 2006), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 63–64;
Pia Kjærsgaard, Frø af ugræs . . . Fjenden indefra har presset Danmark ud i en ustyrlig
situation [Seeds of Weeds . . . The Enemy Within our Borders Has Pressed Denmark into
an Uncontrollable Situation] (Jan. 6, 2006), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra
note 1, at 65–68.
29. See 22 tidligere ambassadører Udtalelse [Press Release, 22 Former Danish Ambassadors Denouncing the Toughening of the Debate], POLITIKEN (Dec. 19, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 57. See also supra notes 27–28.
30. Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised) May 5, 1996, Europ. T.S.
No. 163; Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177.
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permitting states to limit that freedom in certain circumstances.31 Although Danish authorities at the time maintained that these obligations
did not permit remedial action on their part, in fact had they chosen to,
they would not have violated any obligation.32 The two instruments that
Denmark did not ratify are not directly implicated by the cartoon controversy but Denmark’s decision not to ratify them is symptomatic of recent
changes in Danish society that were a contributing factor in escalating
the tensions surrounding the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. More specifically,
these changes reflect a general skepticism of the Danish authorities regarding international human rights instruments. For example, concerning
Protocol 12:
the Danish government is very concerned at the increasing transferal of
legislative powers from the national parliaments to international nonlegislative bodies which cannot be seen as democratically elected organs. Upon ratification, the European Court of Human Rights would be
granted final jurisdiction in matters concerning whether Danish legislation is in compliance with Protocol No.12.33

This statement is especially surprising coming as it does from a country
that was one of the original state parties to the European Convention of
Human Rights and that has historically been active in the Council of
Europe.34
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19 & 20, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 10 & 17, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 363–64 (discussing the interrelation between freedom of expression and other rights and obligations
under the ICCPR and the ECHR).
32. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 360.
33. See DANISH INST. FOR HUM. RTS., PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES: THE COMPLICATED FATE OF PROTOCOL NO.12 TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (Stéphanie Lagoutte ed., 2005).
34. On November 4, 1950, Denmark was among the first states to sign the Council’s
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Chart, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF
=2/28/2008&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Denmark was also one of the founding members of the Council of Europe, together with ten other Western European countries. Council of Europe, Statute of the Council of Europe Chart,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=001&CM=8&DF=2/28/2
008&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Since then, Denmark has signed and ratified
all the protocols amending and completing the European Convention on Human Rights.
See Charts of Ratifications of Protocols at Council of Europe, List of Treaties,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG
(last visited Mar. 13, 2008). Denmark has also signed and ratified major Council of
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B. The Danish Legal Framework
Two provisions of the Danish Criminal Code (“DCC”)35 are implicated
by the cartoon crisis: the hate-speech provision and the blasphemy provision. Section 266b(1)—the so-called racism and hate-speech provision—
states that
any person who, publicly or with the intention of wider dissemination,
makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of
people are threatened, insulted or degraded on account of their race,
colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be
liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two
years.36

Section 140—the so-called blasphemy provision—provides that “any
person who, in public, mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of
worship of any lawfully existing religious community in this country
shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four
months.”37 The object of protection of the hate speech provision, DCC
section 266b, is a group of people belonging to a majority or a minority
who are scorned or degraded, for example, on account of their religion.38
On the other hand, the blasphemy provision, DCC section 140, seeks to
protect religious feelings connected with religions doctrines and acts of
worship.39
Danish civil law provides little in the way of redress for victims of
blasphemy and hate speech. The blasphemy provision appears in the
chapter of the Danish Criminal Code concerned with prevention of public disorder, which reflects the fact that in Denmark an attack on religious beliefs is viewed as harming society at large (public order) and not
merely individual interests.40 Consequently, there is no civil liability provision that corresponds to the criminal provision on blasphemy. Likewise, there is no civil analog to the hate speech provision in DCC section
266b(1).

Europe human rights instruments. See, e.g., European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S.
No. 126.
35. The Danish Criminal Code is called Straffeloven (“Strfl”). An English translation
of the Danish Criminal Code can be found in MALENE FRESE JENSEN ET AL., THE
PRINCIPAL DANISH CRIMINAL ACTS 9–74 (3rd ed. 2006).
36. Strfl. § 266b(1), translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64.
37. Strfl. § 140, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 45.
38. See Strfl. § 266b, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64.
39. See Strfl. § 140, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 45.
40. Koch, supra note 4, at 74.
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There is, however, a civil liability analog to the criminal defamation
statute that could provide a private cause of action for both defamation
and insult.41 According to section 26 of the Liability for Damages Act,42
“[a] person who is responsible for the unlawful violation of another
party’s freedom, peace, honour or person shall pay the aggrieved party
compensation for injury to feelings or reputation.”43 Thus, a racist expression that also constitutes defamation could give rise to civil liability
if it fulfilled the requirements of section 26 of the Liability for Damages
Act. In particular, section 26 requires the aggrieved party to have suffered adverse effects, which would probably have been difficult to prove
in the case of the cartoon crisis.44
Because of the limited availability of civil remedies under Danish law
for blasphemy and hate speech, the prosecution becomes especially important as it is the only actor that can bring such a case before the Danish
courts.45 Consequently, if the prosecution refuses to press the case, it is
unlikely to be examined by any Danish court.46
III. THE DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE
On March 15, 2006, a decision of the Danish Director of Public Prosecution (“DPP”) announced its conclusion that there was no basis for
criminal proceedings in response to the cartoon publication under either
41. Strfl. § 267, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64–65 (“Any person
who violates the personal honor of another by offensive words . . . or by making or
spreading allegations of an act likely to disparage him in the esteem of his fellow citizens
shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment . . . .”).
42. Erstatningsansvarsloven [Liability for Damages Act], Consolidation Act No. 599
(Sept. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Liability for Damages Act].
43. Liability for Damages Act § 26 (“A person who is responsible for the unlawful
violation of another party’s freedom, peace, honour or person shall pay the aggrieved
party compensation for injury to feelings or reputation.”).
44. Building on the reasoning of the DPP under DCC section 266b, it can be argued
that the cartoons were either too specific (they picture the Prophet) or too general (they
picture no Muslims in particular). This view was later confirmed by the City Court of
Århus. This court examined a private application from a number of Muslim associations
based on the above-mentioned provisions, and the court ruled that the publication of the
drawings and the article did not reveal an intention to insult the applicants. These two
provisions required a direct link between the action and the victim; in this respect the
court did not believe that the Muslim associations themselves had been insulted. The
court also stated that the Muslim association could not show that it had a mandate to represent its members. See Århus City Court, Case No. BS 5-851/2006, in MENNESKERET I
DANMARK. STATUS 2006, at 111 (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006) (Danish abstract of the unpublished decision) [hereinafter MENNESKERET].
45. See infra Part III.D.
46. See infra Part III.D.
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the blasphemy or hate-speech provisions in Danish law.47 This decision
resolved an appeal from the decision of the Regional Public Prosecutor
of Viborg declining, after an investigation, to prosecute a claim filed by a
private person with the Chief of Police in Århus. The decision of the
DPP not to prosecute was final.48 The following discussion summarizes
the DPP’s decision, explains why the DPP’s decision foreclosed judicial
consideration of the issues, and reflects on some of the DPP decision’s
main points.
A. The Decision Not to Prosecute Under the Blasphemy Provision
In analyzing the field of DCC section 140’s application, the DPP explained that the statute protects “religious doctrines or acts of worship,”
which covers both the internal and external religious life of a religious
community, i.e., the doctrines (a creed, if any, and the central texts of the
religion), institutions, practices, persons, and things (ritual acts, etc.)
through which the religious community expresses acts of worship. Relying on the legislative record of the statute, the DPP concluded, however,
that the statute did not protect religious feelings that are unrelated to the
religious community’s acts of worship, thus excluding doctrines of an
ethical or social nature. With respect to the element of “mockery or
scorn” required by the statute, the DPP concluded that it encompassed
expressions that convey either a lack of respect or contempt for the
scorned object. In other words, “mockery or scorn” covered expressions
of ridicule or contempt with a certain quantum of abuse. However, the
DPP again invoked the statute’s legislative record to conclude that “punishment can be incurred only in ‘serious cases.’”49
In applying the law thus explained to the facts, the DPP first concluded
that because there is no general and absolute prohibition against drawing
the Prophet Mohamed in Islam (although certain groups within the religion comply fully with the ban on his depiction), drawing the Prophet
could not itself constitute a violation of section 140 of the Criminal
Code.50 The DPP noted, however, that because some drawings were
more than a mere depiction of the Prophet—they were caricatures—
those drawings required an assessment of whether the caricature of such
a central figure in Islam implied ridicule of or contempt for Islamic religious doctrines and acts of worship; this required an analysis of the

47.
48.
49.
50.

DPP decision, supra note 9, at 9.
See infra Part III.D.
DPP decision, supra note 9, at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
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drawings vis-à-vis the accompanying text.51 The DPP concluded that
“the basic assumption must be that Jyllands-Posten commissioned the
drawings for the purpose of in a provocative manner to debate whether,
in a secular society, special regard should be paid to the religious feelings of some Muslims.”52 Consequently, according to the DPP, the caricature53 was “not an expression of mockery or ridicule, and hardly represents scorn within the meaning of [section] 140 of the Danish Criminal
Code.”54 The DPP essentially reasoned that scorn within the meaning of
section 140 is more serious, since it covers contempt and debasement.
Thus, even if the intention of the newspaper was to mock, ridicule, and
scorn, the means of expression did not reach a level serious enough to
warrant prosecution under DCC section 140.55
B. The Decision Not to Prosecute Under the Hate Speech Provision
The DPP’s analysis of the hate speech provision, DCC section 266b,
found that the dispositive inquiry was whether the article and the drawings “insult” or “degrade” a “group of people,” here Muslims, on account
of their religion.56
Confronting this question with respect to the text of the article first, the
DPP noted that the article did not refer to Muslims in general, but referred only to “some” Muslims, i.e., “Muslims who reject the modern,
secular society and demand a special position in relation to their own
religious feelings.”57 Although the DPP concluded that this subset was
within the meaning of “a group of people” as used in section 266b, he
nonetheless concluded that the article could not be considered scornful or
degrading towards this group, even when viewed in context with the
drawings.58
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.
53. The only caricature that troubled the Director of Public Prosecution was one that:
show[ed] the face of a grim-looking man with a turban shaped like an ignited
bomb. . . . [because it was a] depiction of the Prophet Muhammad as a violent
person. This drawing must be considered an incorrect depiction if it is with a
bomb as a weapon, which in the context of today may be understood to imply
terrorism. This depiction may with good reason be understood as an affront and
insult to the Prophet who is an ideal for believing Muslims.
Id. at 7.
54. DPP decision, supra note 9, at 7.
55. Id. at 7–8.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id.
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Next, the DPP considered whether the drawings themselves were insulting or degrading to Muslims. The DPP concluded that the drawings
depicted the Prophet Mohamed as a religious figure, but that none of
them intended to refer to Muslims in general because the drawings depicting individuals other than the Prophet did not contain any general
references to Muslims.59 For example, the DPP concluded that there was
no basis for assuming that the drawing that represented the Prophet with
a turban shaped like a bomb was intended to depict Muslims in general
as perpetrators of violence or even as terrorists.60 The DPP went on to
state more generally that even if the drawings’ depictions of Muslims
were considered in context together with the text of the article, there was
no basis to infer that they were scornful or degrading to Muslims at
large.61 Accordingly, the DPP found that there had not “been any violation of Section 266b of the Danish Criminal Code.”62
C. The Clarification of the Director for Public Prosecution
After analyzing these legal issues at length and determining that there
was no basis for instituting criminal proceedings in this case, the DPP
concluded with an unusual general statement. He noted that the provisions of the Danish Criminal Code on blasphemy and hate-speech, as
well as the provision concerning defamation of character, contain restrictions on the freedom of expression.63 Consequently, to the extent that
public expressions fall within the scope of these rules, there is no unrestricted right to express opinions about religious subjects.64 This comment in effect means that under existing law, it was misleading for the
Jyllands-Posten article to state that the right to freedom of expression is
incompatible with special consideration for religious feelings and that
people must tolerate “scorn, mockery and ridicule.”65 In light of the general debate, the DPP was making a broader point: freedom of expression
is not absolute in Denmark. Expression that is sufficiently scornful or
contemptuous will fall within the scope of one or the other of the two
provisions.66

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 9. See also supra note 53 (describing the cartoon).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 10.
See id.
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D. The Central Role Played by the Prosecution
The blasphemy and hate-speech provisions invoked in the DPP decision belong to a list of offences that are considered important both with
respect to social order at large and in relation to civil liberties protected
by the Danish Constitution.67 Thus, according to the Administration of
Justice Act, violations of sections 140 and 266b are subject to public
prosecution only.68 Consequently, the decision not to prosecute put an
end to the legal controversy generated by the cartoons under Danish domestic law.
The Administration of Justice Act essentially ensures that the DPP’s
decision not to prosecute is, for all intents and purposes, final. Under the
Act, the regional public prosecutor in the first instance and the Director
of Public Prosecution on appeal play a central role in the procedure.69
Although the DPP hears appeals from decisions made by regional public
prosecutors in first instance,70 a decision by the DPP cannot be appealed
to the Minister of Justice.71 However, the Act does not give the Minister
of Justice authority in the first instance to issue orders to public prosecutors concerning the treatment of specific cases, including whether to
commence, continue, refrain from, or terminate prosecution.72
In addition, even though there is no appeal to the Minister of Justice
from the DPP’s decision, section 63 of the Danish Constitution provides
67. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Questionnaire on Domestic Law Concerning the Prohibition of Blasphemy, Religious
Insults and Incitement to Religious Hatred, at 34–35, Study No. 406/2006, CDLFR(2007)002 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDLFR(2007)002-e.pdf [hereinafter European Commission for Democracy Through Law].
68. Administration of Justice Act § 719(2)(3), reproduced in Bekendtgørelse af lov
om rettens pleje [Notice of the Law on the Administration of Justice] (BK nr 1261 af Oct.
23, 2007), available at https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=105378
[hereinafter Notice of the Law on the Administration of Justice].
69. This is an exception to the normal rule, which is that the Chief of Police decides
whether to initiate criminal proceedings. See European Commission for Democracy
Through Law, supra note 67 at 34.
70. Administration of Justice Act § 99(3), reproduced in Notice of the Law on the
Administration of Justice, supra note 68.
71. Id. More generally, there is a principle in Danish administrative law according to
which there is only one opportunity for administrative appeal.
72. Administration of Justice Act § 98(2), reproduced in Notice of the Law on the
Administration of Justice, supra note 68. The instruction must be in writing and state the
reasons for the decision. Furthermore, the Speaker of the Parliament must be informed
(this safeguard was introduced in 2005). The potential for political interference in prosecutions and concrete cases has rightly been criticized by legal scholars, though actual use
of the provision is very limited. European Commission for Democracy Through Law,
supra note 67, at 35.
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for judicial review of the decisions of administrative authorities, including those of the Director of Public Prosecutions.73 The Ombudsman of
the Parliament is also competent to review such decisions.74 However,
their authority to review the discretionary authority of the DPP to prosecute under these provisions is limited. The Danish courts and the Ombudsman are only permitted to review the DPP’s decision for an abuse of
discretion, i.e., whether the criteria applied were legal or whether all
relevant criteria were included,75 but they may not evaluate how the DPP
balances these criteria in the exercise of his discretion.76
As a result of these features of the Danish legal system, namely the
lack of civil remedies77 and the broad, nearly unreviewable discretion of
the DPP, once the DPP made a legally sustainable decision not to prosecute (in the sense that the decision strictly but correctly follows Danish
precedent interpreting DCC sections 140 and 266b), no remedies—
whether administrative or judicial—were then available. Consequently,
the decision of the DPP concluded litigation in Denmark, foreclosed any
judicial consideration of the issue, and brought the legal discussion into
the international arena.78
E. Brief Comments on the Decision
Although the DPP’s decision was well received in Danish legal fora, it
deserves comment because the DPP chose to construe the Danish legal
framework in an exceptionally narrow way.
Generally speaking, a basic tenet of interpretation in criminal law is
that it should be interpreted narrowly. Following the principle nulla

73. Den. Const. art. 63(1) (providing that the courts of justice shall be empowered to
decide any question relating to the scope of the executive’s authority).
74. The Ombudsman Act, Act No. 473 (June 12, 1996), reprinted in THE DANISH
OMBUDSMAN 2005, at 50 (Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen & Jens Olsen eds., 2005).
75. Kaj Larsen, The Parliamentary Ombudsman, in THE DANISH OMBUDSMAN 2005,
supra note 74, at 57, 98.
76. Id. at 103.
77. Liability for Damages Act § 26. See also supra note 43. The Liability for Damage
Act § 26 is the civil pendant of DCC section 267. See Århus City Court Case Abstract, in
MENNESKERET, supra note 44, at 111.
78. A case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights, but the court
declined to hear the case on jurisdictional grounds. Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App. No.
5853/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (click “case-law” then
“HUDOC,” select “decisions” on the left hand column and search for the application
number) (finding no jurisdictional link between the applicants, Moroccans living in Morocco, and the defending state, Denmark).
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poena sine lege,79 judges should not broadly interpret criminal laws so as
to risk creating new offenses, which would violate fundamental human
rights norms.80 The DPP invoked this principle as reflected in the legislative record of the blasphemy statute:
[a]ccording to the legislative material and precedents, Section 140 of
the Danish Criminal Code is to be interpreted narrowly. Therefore the
affront and insult to the Prophet Mohammed, which the drawing may
be understood to be, accordingly cannot, with the necessary certainty,
be assumed to be a punishable offence under Section 140 of the Danish
Criminal Code.81

Other Danish cases that are comparable to the cartoon case suggest that
the modern practice has been to refrain from instigating prosecutions in
such cases. As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, the last conviction under the blasphemy law occurred in 1938.82 Since then, two
cases have come before Danish courts—one in 1946 and the other in
1971—and neither resulted in a conviction.83 Since the middle of the
1970s, public prosecutors in Denmark have chosen not to press charges
in similar cases. For example, the most recent blasphemy case, brought
in 1985, concerned the owner of a restaurant in North Jutland who had
painted a crucified Jesus with an erection on the façade of his restaurant.84 In that case, the DPP stated that it was customary to avoid prosecuting alleged blasphemy offenses and that he saw no reason to diverge
from the general practice in that particular case.85 The case was appealed
to the Justice Ministry, and the Ministry responded that the proper course
of action would be to bring the case before a court in order to determine
79. The Latin translates as “no penalty without a law.” See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1098 (8th ed. 1999).
80. The principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal law is one of the few nonderogable human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 4(2), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(2),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
81. DPP Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
82. See UfR 1938.419 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern
Denmark); Koch, supra note 4.
83. See Gennemgang af Relevante Retsregler Mv [Review of Relevant Legal Regulations], BILAG 1 J.NR. RA-2006-41-0151 § 3.5 (Mar. 15, 2006) (DPP documentation discussing an unpublished 1946 case in which defendants were fined but not brought to
court and an unpublished 1971 case in which defendants were acquitted) [hereinafter
Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation].
84. See id. (discussing unpublished case file no. 133/85 in which the court concluded
that the action was moot because the painting had been taken down).
85. See Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation, supra note 83, § 3.5.
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the scope of the blasphemy provision. However, the Justice Ministry decided not to reverse the DPP’s decision because the painting had already
been taken down and a separate case had been brought against the owner
of the restaurant alleging that the offending sign was in violation of city
planning rules, rendering prosecution under the blasphemy provision unnecessary.86
Although there is no disputed legal issue with respect to the DPP’s interpretation of the blasphemy statute in declining to prosecute in the cartoon controversy case, there is an important, albeit subtle, distinction between the strict, technical legal decision of the DPP and the Justice Ministry’s decision not to prosecute in the case just described. In the latter
case, the Justice Ministry was implicitly critical of the DPP’s decision,
but declined to interfere with established practice. It is exactly this nuance, that is political sensitivity to and indirect support for the sentiments
of the offended part of the population, that is absent in the cartoon controversy.
Unlike the blasphemy statute, the hate-speech provision has been the
subject of a rather more weighty legal discussion, especially with respect
to the gravity criterion.87 The definition of the hate-speech offense punishable by DCC section 266b contains the requirement that the statement
or dissemination of information should be threatening, mocking, or humiliating.88 The statute does not require the prosecution to present evidence that the subject of the alleged hate speech was actually aware of or
felt threatened, mocked, or humiliated by the statement.89 Consequently,
the statute requires an objective assessment of whether the statement in
the specific context can reasonably be expected to produce fear or feelings of mockery or humiliation. An element of intent must also be present, which is closely linked to the offending statement being presented
publicly and which requires that the perpetrator had the intention of
mocking, humiliating, or threatening a group when making the statement.90 When considered together with the fact that the test for whether
the content is “threatening, mocking or humiliating” is an objective one,
the assessment of intent will most often be linked to whether the perpetrator has realized that the statement could be perceived as “threatening,
mocking or humiliating” according to normal usage. Finally, based on
86. See id.
87. See DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BRIEF ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
INSPIRED BY THE MOHAMMED DRAWINGS IN JYLLANDS-POSTEN 14 (2006),
http://www.cihrs.org/Act_file/PDF/85_1812200653621.pdf.
88. Strfl § 266b, translated in JENSEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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the legislative record for section 266b, it appears that the statement must
also meet a minimum requirement of gravity.91 For example, general
statements linking an ethnic group with serious types of crime usually
meet this gravity requirement.92 Although in Denmark it is generally
agreed that politicians who participate in public debates have wide freedom of expression when they make statements about controversial social
issues, the practice of the Danish courts has shown that these politicians
are not exempt from punishment.93 Because of the criterion of minimum
gravity, it can be assumed that, contrary to the practice concerning blasphemy,94 a statement that meets the level of gravity required by section
266b will amount to hate-speech, even in an artistic or satirical context.
Strictly speaking, the DPP’s decision not to prosecute under the hate
speech provision is more or less consistent with restrictive Danish judicial interpretation. However, it is regrettable that the DPP’s restrictive
interpretation excludes any reference to the broader socio-political context within which the Jyllands-Posten’s cartoons were published; this
approach would be in line with the practice of the International Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and of the
European Court of Human Rights.95 In this respect, it is problematic that
the DPP overlooked the views expressed by the ICERD in its decision
not to prosecute.96

91. See UfR 1988.788 V(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Western Denmark
in 1988).
92. See UfR 2004.734 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2004
concerning a Danish politician who had declared on his Web site that Muslims in Denmark perpetrated gross crimes and were a threat to ethnic Danes). See also UfR
2003.2559 Ø(L) (Den.) (judgment of the High Court of Eastern Denmark in 2003 concerning an anti-Semitic and Islamaphobic song posted to a Web site).
93. See UfR 2000.2234 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2000);
UfR 2004.734 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 2004).
94. See Mar. 15, 2006 Documentation, supra note 83, § 3.5 (discussing the unpublished case file No. 133/85 concerning the Jesus painting).
95. See generally Cerone, supra note 8 (discussing the feasibility of reconciling freedom of speech with human rights principles under various human rights instruments).
96. The Danish Member of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights have suggested that
the DPP decision lacked a comprehensive analysis of the international human rights instruments (such as the ICERD) that are directly applicable in Danish law. Section 266b
was inserted in the DCC to bring Denmark into compliance with its obligations under the
ICERD. See Paragraf 266 b: Hvor Blev 266 b Af? [Paragraph 266b: What Has It Gotten
To?], POLITIKEN, Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.sf.dk/index.php?article=10803.
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IV. WHY THE EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?
As the above analysis shows, the Danish decision to refrain from
prosecution in the cartoon controversy is not especially problematic in its
interpretation of Danish law. That said, it may come as a surprise to
many that the legal proceedings were ended by an authority (the DPP)
under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice without any judicial consideration of the matter. Statements by the Prime Minister that offended
parties could always bring their claims before the Danish courts were
patently false;97 once the DPP declined to prosecute, the Danish courts
were precluded from hearing the case.
Returning to the debate surrounding the cartoons, the most striking
element was the emphasis on the allegedly absolute quality of freedom of
expression. Yet there are, as we have seen, provisions in the Danish
Criminal Code that criminalize some forms of expression. In addition,
the major international and regional human rights instruments call for
limitations on freedom of expression as well as its protection.98 Article
10(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention of Human Rights”), which has
been incorporated into Danish law, states that the exercise of freedom of
expression “carries with it duties and responsibilities, [that] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . .”99
Within this well established legal context, the emphasis on the allegedly absolute character of freedom of expression in the early stages of
the cartoon controversy most likely reflects a political choice detached
from the legal and human rights issues at stake in the case. Not surprisingly, the consequences of this choice far exceeded its original context.
The exact motivations for choosing—consciously or not—such a strategy
will surely be analyzed in the future by political scientists and historians.
My purpose here is merely to provide some initial observations that may
help explain the events in Denmark in 2005 by placing them in a broader
Danish context.

97. See Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til Den Islamiske KonferenceOrganisation [Letter from the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the
Organization of the Islamic Conference] (Oct. 31, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET
AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 29; Statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Svar til 11 ambassadører [Letter from Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the 11 Ambassadors]
(Oct. 21, 2005), reprinted in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 28.
98. See Cerone, supra note 8, at 359–60.
99. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
10(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222.
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It is true that freedom of expression is an important and fundamental
human right in both Denmark and the rest of Europe. According to the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual’s
self-fulfillment.”100
The European Court of Human Rights applied this reasoning to overturn the Supreme Court of Denmark (Højesteret) in Jersild v. Denmark.101 The conduct of the Danish authorities and the socio-political
upheaval in the cartoon controversy may be understood as a consequence, in the form of a backlash, of this highly controversial decision.
In Jersild, the TV station DR (the only Danish public TV channel at that
time) broadcast a program in 1985 in which young men, the so-called
“Green Jackets,” expressed hateful and racist views about immigrants
living in Denmark.102 A private party, the Bishop of Aalborg, filed a
complaint against the young men, the program editor, and the journalist
who conducted the interview. In 1987, they were all convicted under the
hate speech provision in DCC section 266b.103 The journalist, Jens Olaf
Jersild, appealed the judgment to the Danish Supreme Court, which, in
1989, upheld the lower court’s judgment.104 In its judgment, the Supreme
Court underscored that freedom of expression, as one of the most fundamental freedoms, deserved the strongest possible protection.105 However,
the Court concluded that the journalist had abused this freedom by publicizing the young men’s offensive statements, especially because otherwise, it was unlikely that the young men would have had an audience.106

100. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737
¶ 49 (1976); Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1994); Steel and Morris
v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 68416/01, ¶ 87 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
http://echr.coe.int/eng.
101. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). For some recent reflections
on the Jersild case by a former Danish judge of the European Court of Human Rights, see
Isi Foighel, Reflections of a Former Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURMOIL 271, 271–74 (Stéphanie Lagoutte, Hans-Otto Sano & Peter
Scharff-Smith eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2007). See generally LENE JOHANNESEN, NEW
LIMITS: LEGAL COMMENT ON A CASE ABOUT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE-SPEECH
(Danish Centre for Human Rights 1996).
102. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10.
103. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (citing an unpublished decision of the
Københavns Byret [City Court of Copenhagen] dated Apr. 24, 1987).
104. UfR 1989.399 H (Den.) (judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in 1989).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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The European Court of Human Rights rejected the Danish Supreme
Court’s view and found that Denmark’s imposition of criminal sanctions
violated article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.107 The
European Court concluded that the journalist had simply done his job:
the program was informative, the context was not at all racist, and the
intent was to illustrate that some marginal groups had very racist views
on immigrants.108 For the European Court judges, the balance tipped in
favor of freedom of expression. This shocked the Danish legal world.
Judges and legal scholars thought that the Danish Supreme Court, sensitive to the Danish domestic context, was correct: the statements were
outrageous, and the young men and those who had promoted the statements deserved punishment.109 The outcome in the European Court never
gained acceptance in Denmark and as a result was misunderstood. As a
consequence, an egregious misinterpretation spread among the Danish
audience, namely that journalists could report anything in any way they
chose because there was no limit to their freedom of expression.
There are many differences between the Jersild case and the cartoon
controversy, one being that the latter never became an actual case. In
addition, there are two other important differences. First, publishing the
cartoons seems to have been designed as a provocation and not as a public information piece. If the newspaper had wanted to inform its readership about self-censorship based on the fear of reprisals by Muslims, the
journalists could merely have documented the alleged threats. Second, in
1985, the racist comments made by the young men outraged Danish citizens on a large scale.110 Cartoons offending the religious feelings of part
of the population more than twenty years later did not inspire the same
outrage.
In this new context, there were several ways the Prime Minister, the
government, and the newspaper could have reacted, yet they chose to
emphasize free expression to the exclusion of all other values as follows:
1) freedom of expression is absolute; 2) absolute freedom of expression
is a pillar of Danish society and culture, and therefore self-censorship is
unacceptable; 3) because freedom of expression is absolute, the Prime
Minister and government cannot criticize newspapers and journalists for
exercising it. Yet, as demonstrated above, freedom of expression in
Denmark is not absolute. Moreover, journalists often engage in selfcensorship, consciously or not; for a variety of reasons, journalists do not

107.
108.
109.
110.

Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24–26.
Id. at 19.
See Foighel, supra note 101, at 273.
Id.
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write or disseminate all of the information at their disposal.111 Finally,
the Prime Minister and members of the government can, of course, criticize the media and journalists. Such criticism is part of the democratic
process—it does not amount to interference with freedom of expression.
Indeed, this absolutism is troubling in light of its questionable legal
foundation and in light of other features of the broader Danish context,
which, when taken together, may indicate an environment that was inhospitable, if not implicitly hostile, to Muslims.
In the years preceding the cartoon controversy, the depiction of Muslims in the Danish media and in public debates had been, if not directly
negative, very often related to some kind of problem. In this respect, it is
important to recall that the various incidents mentioned by the eleven
ambassadors from Muslim countries in their letter to the Prime Minister
were already well known.112 In addition, for some years the media had
participated—more or less aggressively—in the ongoing over-exposure
of problematic issues purportedly of concern to Muslims: wearing of
scarves, circumcision, religious divorce, ritual slaughtering, forced marriages, honor killings, and so-called “re-education trips” for youngsters
to their parents’ countries of origins. These topics made for catchy headlines in the Danish media, often with very little documentation as to the
reality, accuracy, and extent of the issues.113 Moreover, despite a growing
Muslim population, at the time of the cartoon controversy there were no
publicly funded places of worship or cemeteries for Muslims in Denmark.114 Finally, Denmark had for some time been subject to criticism
111. See, e.g., Brinkley & Fisher, supra note 13 (describing U.S. newspapers’ decisions not to republish the cartoons).
112. Islamisk trossamfund m.fl.: Brev til muslimske ambassadører [Letter from the
Muslim Organizations to the Muslim Ambassadors in Denmark] (Oct. 5, 2005), reprinted
in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 18–19.
113. For a vivid description of the problems linked to the attitude of the Danish media,
see Council of Eur., Eur. Comm’n Against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on
Denmark ¶¶ 89, 104–06, Doc. No. CRI(2006)18 (2005). In its report, the “ECRI urges
the Danish Government to give a more balanced view of issues pertaining to minority
groups and their role in Danish society.” Id. ¶ 107. It also “strongly recommends that the
Danish Government encourage and provide financial support to initiatives aimed at training journalists on issues pertaining to human rights in general and to racism and racial
discrimination in particular.” Id. ¶ 108. See also Danske forfattere [Danish Writers], Pas
På Tonen! [Watch Your Tone!] POLITIKEN, Oct. 15, 2005, reprinted in THE PROPHET
AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 54–56 (dwelling on the tone in the Danish media). Finally, on
the anti-Islamic rhetoric, see RUNE ENGELBRETH LARSEN & TØGER SEIDENFADEN,
KARIKATURKRISEN. EN UNDERSØGELSE AF BAGGRUND OG ANSVAR 24–33 (Gyldendal
2006) [hereinafter Larsen & Seidenfaden].
114. Concerning these issues, see Jørgen Bæk Simonsen, Constitutional Rights and
Religious Freedom in Practice. The Case of Islam in Denmark, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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and scrutiny regarding its legal treatment of foreigners, citizenship, and
discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin.115 The toughening up of
the laws concerning foreigners or Danes with close ties to other countries
of origin raised concern and criticism, both nationally and internationally.116 Both the general climate in Denmark and the growing awareness
of international and national observers shows that the publication of the
cartoons did not occur in a vacuum. A context was already in place—one
that might have elicited a more nuanced and sympathetic reaction from
those in power.
CONCLUSION
The restrictive approach followed by the DPP in his decision excluded
any reference to the broader context within which the Jyllands-Posten’s
cartoons were published, and it did not question the motives of the newspaper in publishing these cartoons. This is regrettable, but it does not
necessarily mean that the decision of the DPP was legally incorrect. That
said, the narrow construction of Danish law that the DPP applied also
reflected its broader context because the outcome weighed so heavily in
favor of freedom of expression.
Human rights, like freedom of expression, should not be reduced to absolutes. International human rights law is also based on the central value
of respect for other human beings and on a common goal to ensure
peace.117 In this respect, the cartoon controversy seems to be less about

AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE: THE POSITION OF ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 20,

26 (W.A.R. Shahid & P.S. van Koningsveld eds., 2002).
115. For instance, a statement made by a member of the Parliament likening Muslims
to pedophiles and rapists was reported to the police and the Prosecution service. See Mohammed Hassan Gelle v. Denmark, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2006). During its
sixty-eighth session (Feb. 20–Mar. 10, 2006), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination concluded that Denmark failed to carry out an effective investigation to
determine whether an act of racial discrimination had taken place. Id. ¶¶ 7.1–7.6.
116. See Council of Europe, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Report by
Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on His Visit to Denmark ¶¶ 1–
7, Doc. No. CommDH(2004)12 (July 8, 2004). This report strongly criticized the new
provisions concerning spouse reunification, family reunification for children, and the
general lack of precision in the new provisions of the Aliens Act. See also INSTITUT FOR
MENNESKERETTIGHEDER [DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS], UDREDNING NR. 1:
ÆGTEFÆLLESAMMENFØRING I DENMARK [ANALYSIS NO. 1: SPOUSE REUNIFICATION IN
DENMARK] 7–16 (2004) (reporting on the tightening up of the provisions of the Aliens
Act concerning family reunification in 2002 and 2003).
117. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR];
ICCPR, supra note 7, pmbl. Both of these sources dwell on human rights as the founda-
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the law and more about questions of decency, respect for others, and responsible behavior. At the time of publication, it seems that the political
climate in Denmark made the cartoons’ publication completely uncontroversial to the Danish authorities—to them, that freedom of expression
of the majority outranked the freedom of religion of the minority was
self-evident.
The ensuing international reaction shocked Denmark at large, but also
resulted in important changes. The crisis gave greater visibility than ever
before to Danish and non-Danish Muslims in Denmark.118 Within Denmark, the debate on Muslims, the role of the press, democratic values,
and the place given to religion in the public sphere forged new connections between these groups in Danish society. Public authorities undertook concrete initiatives concerning separate burial grounds for Muslims,
and in September 2006, Denmark’s first Islamic cemetery opened in a
suburb of Copenhagen.119 The media took steps to ensure more balanced
coverage of the Muslim community in Denmark.120
The Danish authorities’ insensitivity to the sentiments of the minority
and the hostile socio-political context in which the cartoons occurred
exacerbated the controversy and precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Although the decision not to prosecute the Danish newspaper was a relatively uncontroversial application of Danish law, had the Danish authorities exercised greater sensitivity, much of the crisis could have been
averted.
As is often the case concerning the relation between the state and religion,121 an open dialogue could well have defused the conflict. To para-

tion for peace in the world. See also UDHR, supra, pmbl. (insisting on the importance of
promoting the development of friendly relations between nations).
118. See generally Simonsen, supra note 114.
119. On September 22, 2006, Denmark’s first Islamic cemetery opened in Brøndby,
near Copenhagen. Islamic Cemetery Opens at Last, COPENHAGEN POST, Sept. 22, 2006,
http://www.cphpost.dk/get/98096.html. The two major building projects concerning
mosques in Denmark, close to the two largest cities, Århus and Copenhagen, are still
having trouble finding private funds. Byg En Moske I København [Build a Mosque in
Copenhagen], POLITIKEN, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2006/02/
01/074757.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
120. For instance, the Danish public TV station was quite exemplary in this respect. Its
coverage of Ramadan in 2006 provided much needed insight into the life of Muslim
families (Danes and foreigners) in Denmark during this holy event. See DR, Ramadankalenderen, http://www.dr.dk/DR2/Ramadan (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
121. Concerning dialogue as a means to renew the relationship between state and religion in Europe, see Stéphanie Lagoutte & Eva Maria Lassen, Meeting the Challenge: Redefining Europe’s Classical Model for State Intervention in Religious Practices, 24
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 33, 57–59 (2006).
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phrase the Director of English PEN, Jonathan Heawood,122 we must not
allow a choice between our commitment to freedom of expression and
our respect for religious and minority rights to be forced upon us. We
must all learn to conduct an argument, a debate, and most importantly, a
dialogue between all interested parties.123

122. See English PEN, About English PEN, Staff and Officers, http://www.englishpen.
org/aboutenglishpen/staffandofficers/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). PEN, a worldwide
association of writers with 145 centers in 104 countries, exists to promote friendship and
intellectual cooperation among writers everywhere, with the goal of protecting freedom
of expression and the integrity of world literature. See International PEN, Who We Are,
http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
123. Jonathan Heawood, Publish and be Damned? Free Speech, Religious Hatred and
the C artoon Controversy, in THE PROPHET AFFAIR, supra note 1, at 277.

